Zimbabwe: What if not a coup?
How do you view the events surrounding the change of power in Zimbabwe?

In essence, it was a power struggle within the ruling party ZANU-PF. Within this party, there is the “old guard”, which led the struggle for liberation against the white minority regime until 1980 and still seeks to maintain their position today. I believe that this group, which is close to the former Vice President and current President Emmerson Mnangagwa, sees their sinecure threatened by a different wing of the party, the so-called generation 40, or G40, which supported Mugabe and his wife Grace, and they felt they had to act accordingly.
Was the old guard able to consolidate their power with this “coup”?
Emmerson Mnangagwa is a member of this old guard as much as Mugabe himself. They saw their hopes being dashed as Mugabe started preparing to choose Grace Mugabe as the next president. The old guard have secured their position of power for the time being.
Is Emmerson Mnangagwa just another “Big Man” in Africa?
From the current perspective yes, however we will need to watch how things develop. The population of Zimbabwe seemed optimistic and welcomed him euphorically as the new president. The international donor community seems to be cautiously willing to make a fresh start with him.
Yet the underlying system has not changed. There is still a system of dependence and patronage in the country. The governing party with its propaganda machine is still firmly in control. Another Unity Government like the one that was formed between the ZANU-PF party and the opposition from 2008 to 2012 has been brought into discussion but is very unlikely. The elections next year will show whether the political system will become more open and whether an opposition party will have a fair chance of winning an election.
How democratic were the most recent elections in Zimbabwe?
As a former liberation fighter, Mugabe enjoyed widespread support among the population in the 1980s and 1990s. After he lost a referendum in 2000, which was supposed to grant him extended power, the economic decline accelerated and the political landscape in the country became considerably more treacherous. Around the same time, the Movement for Democratic Change MDC came into the picture and it became more difficult for Mugabe to win elections. In 2008, he lost the first round of the presidential election against his challenger Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC. Many believe the current President Emmerson Mnangagwa is responsible for the waves of violence that were directed at the MDC, which resulted in its candidate Tsvangirai withdrawing from the runoff election. This secured Mugabe’s victory.
Strong international pressure ultimately led to a “Unity Government”. Mugabe, however, managed to ensure that the MDC was not in a strong and influential position to make significant changes. The Prime Minister Tsvangirai and the MDC ministers appeared so pale that Mugabe might actually have won the subsequent election. It is quite possible that the large-scale manipulation previously used was no longer needed in this election. Since then, Mugabe – and the ZANU-PF along with him – has consolidated their control over Zimbabwe. From then on, Mugabe’s power could only be threatened from within the ZANU-PF party.
Why then are Zimbabweans celebrating Mugabe’s removal?
The country had lapsed into lethargy. The veil of Mugabe’s power hung over everything, and Grace Mugabe was lurking in the shadows and along with her a continuation of the same policies. We must recall that Mugabe had controlled the fate of the country for 37 years and that younger Zimbabweans had known no other leader than him. The hope that something new would now arrive, even though it was rather unclear what exactly that was, brought the joyous people onto the streets.
What problems at the political level will Mugabe’s successor have to solve?
If he is serious about democracy, he must hold free and democratic elections next year. And he must continue to reconcile the different groups within the society. In Zimbabwe, there are various lines of conflict as between the black majority and white minority, between ZANU-PF supporters and MDC supporters, between those who benefit from the patronage system and those who are excluded or suffer from it. Regarding reconciliation with the dispossessed white farmers, in particular after 2000, Mnangagwa has presented the idea of some kind of compensation. But he did not say that their farms would be returned to them.
Is this a step in the right direction?
Yes, but you must not forget that this is precisely why Mugabe is revered in many countries of Africa and hailed as a hero; because he pushed through this policy of expropriating white farmers. Even within Zimbabwe he is still appreciated for this. It was simply unfair that white farmers captured the best pieces of agricultural land in the course of colonization and later under the white minority government of Ian Smith.
Under Mugabe a gentlemen’s agreement with the white farmers was in place until the 1990s, which in essence said: We’ll not get involved in each other’s business. The farmers’ role was to continue to generate good returns and, in return, land redistribution was suspended. This agreement fell apart with the failed Referendum in 2000, when Mugabe played his last trump card to retain power by expropriating white farmers and thereby finally fulfilling his promise of land redistribution which he had widely discussed but never carried out. He sought to secure the support of the black community, but ultimately he drove the country deeper into economic collapse.
... and the white farmers took their know-how with them when they left country, many of whom moved to South Africa. How did the other African states react to the coup?
The African Union AU follows a clear and strict doctrine: It does not recognise non-constitutional changes of government. Each state in which a non-constitutional change of government takes place will be automatically suspended from the AU – at least until new elections are held. This is also a key reason why the military elite in the ZANU-PF party asserted from the outset that it was not a coup, and they maintained this idea until the very end.
Would you describe it as a classic military coup?
There were elements of a classic coup, and Mugabe was certainly put under pressure. On the other hand, one can argue that perhaps the military only had to set up a threatening scenario for Mugabe which would force him to deal with the realities of the country and see that support for him crumbled. As he had lived the last ten, fifteen years largely isolated from the population, maybe it suddenly became clear to him what was actually happening in his country and what the population really thought of him.
He realized that he might not be a semi-god he probably thought he was and decided to resign now that he was aware of these realities. Seen from this perspective, the military’s manoeuvres were perhaps only the trigger but not a classic coup d’état. Accordingly, the AU has not yet suspended Zimbabwe, although initially there was significant outcry within the AU.
What can Zimbabwe expect in the near future?
I believe it is quite probable that Mnangagwa will calmly bring this parliamentary term to a close. Next year he will be elected and the ZANU-PF will continue as the ruling party, probably even with an absolute majority. Changes are unlikely, because there is a system of dependency in Zimbabwe, which Mnangagwa will probably be able to maintain.
Will there be any opposition?
In many dictatorships, and Zimbabwe is not different in this respect, there is the phenomenon that the opposition finds it difficult to make a good offer to the population, mainly because it is often at loggerheads. By having been a part of the Unity Government beginning in 2008, the MDC has lost its lustre and credibility, because the hope that the party would be able to effectively change something within the government has not been fulfilled. One strength of authoritarian regimes often is having a weak opposition. I see this happening in Zimbabwe as well, as the opposition is not united. The probability that the current political elite will continue to control the country, no matter how the election turns out, is quite high.
And this is how the system reproduces itself?
I’m not so sure. The intensive Bush War against the white minority government was conducted in the 1970s. With a few exceptions, it is this generation of independence fighters who still hold the power in Zimbabwe. The interesting question is: When and how will the next generation join the ranks?
What is likely to change in the medium term is the justification for maintaining the ZANU-PF as the ruling party. The very basis of Mugabe’s rule as well as the argument the military representatives brought to the public immediately after it intervened was the same: We have to defend the revolution. We must defend the legacy of the Second Chimurenga, that is, the armed struggle against the white supremacy. [The First Chimurenga, which means ‘revolutionary struggle’ in the Shona language, took place against colonial powers in the 1890s. – Ed.]
Once this justification no longer applies, as the generation of the Bush War fighters will no longer be alive, it will be interesting to see how the next generation will justify their grip to power. The up and coming generation was born well after 1980, the year the country gained independence. However, it is difficult to predict what arguments this new generation of politicians will use.
What is striking, however, is that hardly anyone in Zimbabwe plays down Mugabe’s historical significance from the 70s and 80s. In this respect, the ZANU-PF will probably continue to see itself as a defender of the revolution and independence, at least in the medium term, and will base their upcoming election campaign on this argument.
Then we should not expect any change in policy from the younger generation?
A lot will depend on whether Mnangagwa is successful with his economic policies. Zimbabwe’s economy is down and out, amongst others because in recent years its monetary policy was simply to print the money it needed. If the new president can attract donors to the country, if he somehow enables the slightest economic upturn, I can imagine that business will go on as usual and the younger generation will still have to wait. Regardless, the question remains whether they would bring about any changes at all.
With a clear focus on Mugabe and the struggle for power within the old guard in recent years, no young successor beyond Grace Mugabe has put themselves in position to take control. Therefore, it is unclear who even represents the young generation at all. It didn’t help the head of the ZANU-PF Youth League when he hemmed and hawed after the military intervention, first swearing his loyalty to Mugabe before turning his back to him.
Zimbabwe is experiencing exciting political times, and many things still remain to be seen. One of the country’s greatest advantage is that despite decades of Mugabe’s rule the level of education in the country is high and the infrastructure is still in good state. These conditions are not so bad; however, I am sceptical because of the depth of the patronage system in Zimbabwe.
The political scientist Dr. Martin Welz is academic coordinator of the MA programme “International Administration and Conflict Management”. His research mainly focuses on the relations of the United Nations with regional organizations, in particular the African Union. He is currently writing a book on the history and politics of Africa after decolonization.
Further Information
Stephen Chan and Julia Gallagher: Why Mugabe Won: The 2013 elections in Zimbabwe and their aftermath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017.
Martin Welz and Daniela Kromrey: Legacies of the Past: The Influence of Former Freedom Fighters and their Rhetoric in Southern Africa. In: Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies. 42, 2 (2015), S. 255-273. online
Martin Welz: Integrating Africa: Decolonization’s Legacies, Sovereignty and the African Union. London: Routledge 2012. (with one chapter on Zimbabwe)